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2Introduction
The PAC is responsible for the non-partisan audit of public expenditure. Created in 
1861, it has long been viewed as one of the parliament’s most powerful committees 
(Chubb, 1952; Flegmann, 1979). Rush (2005: 208) described the PAC as ‘one of, if 
not the, most effective of parliamentary committees’ or ‘the queen of the select 
committees’ (Public Accounts Committee, 2007). The PAC’s reputation is enhanced 
when compared with parliament’s continued weakness in ex ante decision-making 
power (Wehner 2003).  Scrutiny of government spending proposals is one of the 
weakest areas of parliamentary scrutiny in the U.K. and the House’s power over 
expenditure has been described as close to a “constitutional myth” (Select Committee 
on Procedure 1999: para 5).
The creation of departmental select committees in 1979 enabled the PAC to act as 
primus inter pares, with its long history, tradition of consensus and non-political 
reputation and support of the National Audit Office (NAO) crucial to its success.  
Comparative studies across the Commonwealth (Stapenhurst et al. 2005; Pelizzo et al. 
2006), have examined what makes PACs work effectively and the good practice 
identified – such as the whether the PAC is chaired by an Opposition member and the 
activity of the committee – and such studies have tended to reinforce the UK PAC’s 
reputation. 
At home, however, the PAC’s standing vis-à-vis the other committees has been 
affected by the increased profile given to the Liaison Committee, consisting of the 
3chairs of all the select committees in the House of Commons, particular now that the 
Prime Minister appears before the committee to give evidence on matters of public 
policy three times a year.  The Joint Committee on Human Rights, established in 2001, 
undertakes thematic inquiries on human rights issues and scrutinises all Government 
Bills for human rights implications and has also developed a strong reputation in its 
short existence.  Meanwhile the departmental select committees, which unlike the PAC 
consider the merits of policy rather than its implementation, have matured with the 
introduction of core tasks and heightened public expectation. The welcome 
development of legislative oversight capacity may have led to increased competition 
for attention across the various parliamentary committees, but this study will 
demonstrate that the PAC continues to receive great attention. 
Wider changes across the political landscape have also impacted upon the PAC. The 
Westminster PAC no longer has a role in scrutinising much of the expenditure in the 
devolved parts of the UK. Before devolution in 1999, audit in the U.K. was 
concentrated from the centre and carried out by the NAO and the PAC. Audit 
devolution was developed administratively through the operation of distinct 
procedures in the U.K. PAC at Westminster (in line with other distinct procedures 
established at Westminster for Scotland and Wales). Devolution has seen the creation 
of separate audit bodies for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the 
establishment of PACs in each legislature [1]. The amount of time spent on public 
audit has therefore dramatically increased and provides further evidence for what 
Power (1994) describes as an “audit explosion” within the U.K. 
4This chapter examines the structures, responsibilities and working practices of the 
committee, drawing on the response to a questionnaire that was sent to the U.K. PAC 
House of Commons by the World Bank Institute in 2008/9 as well as a literature and 
press review of its work and modus operandi. Achieving good value for public money 
has always been important, but the aftermath of the financial crisis and the budgetary 
cuts across most government departments make this an opportune time to re-examine 
the PAC’s role and performance, particularly since the leadership of the committee is 
now undertaken by its first directly-elected chair. The analysis highlights the growing 
importance of the NAO and PAC, partly because of increased access rights and partly 
as a result of the actions taken by the committee in the current parliament. 
Heightened PAC visibility has led, in turn, to some criticism and a greater focus on the 
PAC itself.  The NAO’s evidence-based findings have long been important for the 
PAC, but this relationship has now become even more critical with the NAO’s reports 
serving as a shield for the PAC. For its part, the PAC can operate at a more visible and 
political level than the more circumspect and cautious NAO, taking a sword to waste 
and inefficiency across the public sector. Finally, the study argues that measuring the 
impact of the PAC in terms of financial savings and the number of recommendations 
implemented is likely to undervalue the committee’s actual influence.
Powers and Responsibilities
5Operating under the authority of the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, 
principally No. 148, the PAC’s remit is ‘the examination of the accounts showing the 
appropriation of the sums granted by Parliament to meet the public expenditure, and 
of such other accounts laid before Parliament as the Committee may think fit’.  The 
committee has the unrestricted right to access government agencies, statutory 
authorities, government-owned corporations and government service providers. It can 
summon officials from any publicly-funded body to which the NAO has access and 
can summon representatives of any body involved in the spending of public money by 
virtue of the power, common to all Select Committees, of calling for “persons, papers 
and records”. 
The PAC has the right to examine public accounts and financial affairs and can 
consider issues of efficiency, economy and effectiveness of programme 
implementation as well as the effectiveness of policy implementation. The PAC does 
not look at the merits of policy: this falls to the Departmental Select Committees. 
Indeed, the PAC today seldom looks at the accounts of government departments. This 
is partly because the programme of value money studies is so intensive and partly 
because the Departmental Select Committees are now expected to carry out this role 
(although the extent to which they do so varies). However, the PAC still has the right 
to take evidence about them, and regularly examines, for example, aspects of the 
accounts of the Revenue and Customs. 
6One of the differences across the U.K. concerns a PAC’s access to local government. 
The Welsh PAC has an unrestricted right of access to local government while the 
scrutiny of local councils in Scotland falls within the responsibility of the Accounts 
Commission which forms part of Audit Scotland, but reports to Scottish Ministers. 
England has a separate Audit Commission charged with the oversight of both local 
government and a range of other locally active bodies and a NAO for central 
government operations. In other words devolution has enabled Scotland and Wales to 
adopt alternative audit arrangements which differ from those pursued in England. 
However, the extent of divergence should not be exaggerated as there are also 
pressures to converge. In 2007, the five UK audit agencies (the Audit Commission, 
Audit Scotland, the NAO, the Northern Ireland Audit Office and the Wales Audit 
Office) jointly launched a set of indicators through the Public Audit Forum with the 
aim to create consistency across the audit bodies.
England is facing the loss of one of its audit bodies with the Audit Commission 
expected to close in 2015, 30 years after it was established, with the expectation that 
independent audit committees will be created within the local authority to ensure the 
independence of the audit relationship and protect the principle that public bodies 
should not appoint their own auditors. One of the key justifications for contracting out 
local government audit to private firms is to bring the public sector audit regime into 
line with the private sector: arrangements for the monitoring of audit quality will be 
aligned with those in place for audits of private sector companies carried out under the 
Companies Act. Whether this is a positive change for local government is a matter for 
7debate; one issue raised is that the audit of public bodies generally requires a broader 
scope than the audit of financial statements for private companies. 
A further interpretation of the decision to abolish the Audit Commission is that it 
signals a retreat from the idea of a regulatory state with the centre setting objectives 
and targets and the local government devising the delivery methods. Indeed, the 
Coalition government has justified the end of the Commission as part of its 
commitment to localism and a move away from a “Command and Control” approach 
to central-local government, particularly evident under New Labour.  As a 2014 PAC 
report highlighted, local authorities were given £36.1 billion in 2013-14, ‘of which 
£32.9 billion had no specific conditions attached as to how local authorities could use 
it, other than that spending was lawful’ (PAC 2014, 5). 
There does, however, appear to be an inconsistency in the coalition government’s 
approach and rhetoric. On the one hand there is an attempt to extend the local scrutiny 
function, on the other local authorities remain dependent on central government and 
central taxpayers.  From a local democracy perspective, the argument that the national 
legislature, and bodies reporting to Westminster, should have a role in addressing 
accountability at the local level is controversial.  Yet this may be inevitable if money 
is raised and distributed from the centre as the national legislature has a duty to ensure 
such money is spent wisely. This view is supported by a 2014 Inquiry into Local 
Government funding as the Department for Communities and Local Government was 
unable to confirm that local authorities achieve value for money with government 
8funding (PAC 2014, 3)). This may justify why some of the Audit Commission's 
functions will transfer to the NAO, but it is hardly an argument for localism. 
The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) will be given the Audit Commission’s 
role of preparing the Code of Audit Practice which sets out the framework within 
which local auditors carry out their work, and will also be empowered to produce 
guidance to local auditors. A second provision of the Bill increases the NAO’s capacity 
to undertake examinations regarding the ‘value for money’ with which local public 
bodies have used their resources. This was previously the statutory duty of the Audit 
Commission which, unlike the NAO, had an explicit duty to scrutinise government 
policy. The hope is that this change will inform Parliament and add value at the local 
level, but it is worth noting that the government promoted this change without prior 
consultation with the Parliament. The NAO’s examination of local government will 
focus on studies across local government instead of the workings of individual 
authorities. However, the current chair of the PAC, Margaret Hodge, has indicated that 
the Committee would in future seek to look at individual councils’ performance 
(Keeling, 2013). The result is a degree of confusion and uncertainty across local 
government on the approach and reach of national bodies.
The demise of the Audit Commission and extension of the work of the NAO is 
evidence of a third trend: the broadening of the U.K. NAO and PAC’s access rights. 
In response to Lord Sharman's 2001 report on audit and accountability in central 
Government, the C&AG was given the right to carry out public sector audits of the 
9accounts of certain non-departmental public bodies that are registered companies, as 
well as their subsidiary companies. This was a response to the fragmentation of public 
services. Civil list expenditure and the BBC’s accounts are also now subject to NAO 
and PAC scrutiny and the PAC has used this new access to release critical reports on 
high-profile issues such as the Duchy of Cornwall accounts (PAC: 2013a) and the 
BBC’s relocation expenses as part of its move to a new centre in Salford (PAC 2013b). 
Government departments continue to contract work to the private and third sectors and 
there are still demands for access to further bodies to ensure appropriate oversight and 
accountability. The current PAC chair is in favour of giving the C&AG the right to 
examine the accounts of those private businesses which are delivering public contracts 
and she is also pushing for the government to sign an openness clause when signing a 
contract with the public sector. 
The C&AG and NAO
The C&AG is appointed by the Queen on a motion in the Commons in the name of the 
Prime Minister (PM) with the agreement of the Chair of the PAC. For the appointment 
of the current C&AG, the PAC Chair presided over a small appointments panel, 
including the Permanent Secretary at the Treasury (representing the PM) and the 
incumbent C&AG, as an independent observer. A name was then put to the PM who 
10
approved the nomination. The then chair of the PAC defended the involvement of the 
PM as follows:
“there is a need for the Government to have confidence in the person appointed 
because that person has unlimited access to all private papers and persons of the 
Government …the current situation…in which both the Prime Minister and the 
Opposition Chairman of the PAC have to agree is not unreasonable. I say that as long 
as the Government appreciate the difference between selection and appointment, they 
need to be involved in the appointment, but not in the selection. That should be the 
job of the house”. [2]
The PAC as a body has no formal role in the selection of the C&AG, but it did hold a 
hearing with the current postholder before he was formally appointed. This is part of a 
broader trend from 2007 towards pre-appointment hearings which are non-binding on 
Ministers. It has since been agreed the C&AG-designate will appear before the PAC 
once a name had been announced, but before the debate on the motion for the 
appointment. The Liaison Committee (2011: 3) has described pre-appointment 
hearings as “a modest step forward in securing democratic accountability of ministerial 
decision-making.” However, it could potentially put the committee at odds in future 
with both its Chair and the PM. 
Previous C&AGs have been appointed for life (or until they have decided to retire), to 
protect the independence of the position. The term has now been limited to a non-
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renewable ten-year term. This brings the U.K. in line with most other European and 
Commonwealth Parliaments  - the AG in Scotland is appointed to a single, non-
renewable term of 8 years and the Welsh National Assembly can fix the period of 
office at the time of appointment.  A motion passed by both Houses of Parliament is 
required to dismiss a C&AG, but neither the Chair of the PAC nor the committee as a 
whole has a statutory role in this. The U.K. PAC therefore has less formal power than 
those PACs that are required by law to approve the C&AG’s appointment and any 
motion to remove him of her from office. However, this may under-estimate both the 
informal power and involvement of the committee through the pre-appointment 
process and the actual powers and influence of the PAC Chair.
Once appointed, a close working relationship has traditionally existed between the 
PAC Chair and the C&AG. The C&AG, or his representative, is present at all evidence 
sessions and can be questioned by members and can also question witnesses at the 
discretion of the Chair. The NAO also produces the first draft of a PAC report. The 
clerk then considers the report, before being forwarded to the chair for comment (the 
normal practice in most other jurisdictions is for the PAC secretariat to draft the 
report). The C&AG has complete discretion in the choice of the NAO’s programme of 
value for money studies, but is obliged by statute to consult the PAC.  It should also 
be noted that the NAO (2012: 6) is seeking to be more responsive by producing rapid 
investigations following concerns raised by MPs, whistleblowers and the public.
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The non-party aspect of the PACs work, and preference for unanimity – long thought 
essential for any PAC – is greatly assisted by its ability to draw on the factual, 
comprehensive and evidence-based reports of the C&AG. Similarly, the PAC 
increases the authority of the reports of the C&AG, by adding the necessary political 
weight; the Government is formally obliged to respond to PAC but not to NAO 
recommendations. A plus-sum relationship is the result. The PAC can also provide 
more strident criticisms than the more sober assessments released by the NAO. Sharma 
(2007) documents how NAO Value for Money reports can be altered before final 
publication and Dunleavy et al. (2009, 44) raise the question of a possible regulatory 
risk whereby the NAO may have ‘a tendency to ‘pull its punches’ in terms of its 
comments on departments and agencies, especially in not criticising most departmental 
figures and reasoning… because of the difficult departmental clearance process, which 
each report must go through’. Yet, this risk is mitigated by the fact that NAO staff can 
provide private oral briefings to the PAC and by the work and criticisms of the PAC 
itself. The NAO provides the ammunition for the PAC to fire and working together 
they are both better equipped to force departments to justify their actions when 
spending public money.
The Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 created the statutory basis for 
the NAO’s governance, by establishing the NAO as a corporate entity, with a statutory 
Board. The Public Accounts Commission, a parliamentary committee separate from 
the PAC but with overlapping membership, is formally responsible for the 
appointment of the non-executive members of the NAO Board and the external auditor 
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of the NAO. The Commission is also responsible for scrutinising the NAO’s budget: 
the NAO appears before it twice a year – once to consider the NAO’s three-year 
strategy and once to consider the NAO’s estimate.  The PAC gives an opinion on the 
budget, but the decision remains one for the Commission and it is voted directly by 
Parliament as a separate line in the requisitions of the parliamentary vote.  
The arms-length approach between the PAC and NAO is justified because of fears that 
the PAC may have a vested interest in maximising resources to the Audit Office. Yet 
resources to the NAO have increased in recent years to cope with its broadened 
mandate: in 2007 the NAO’s budget was £90 million - almost double its budget in 
2001 [3]. The NAO (2013: 20) is reducing costs by 15 per cent by 2014-15, but it is 
notable that support for Parliament is increasing – both to the PAC and to Select 
Committees – and now acts as about 10% of the NAO’s total cost base (Public 
Accounts Commission, 2013: 13). This is understandable given that the Chair of the 
PAC is a member of the Public Accounts Commission and her predecessor is the 
current chair of the Commission. The operational links between the NAO and the PAC 
therefore remain strong even though these are formally exercised through the 
Commission. 
Membership and Leadership of the PAC
The typical size of a PAC in the Commonwealth is 11 members (McGee, 2012:61).  
This level of variation is comparable to the relative size of the Parliament and similar 
14
differences exist across the U.K. where the Westminster PAC is the largest with 14 
members (reduced from 16 in the previous parliament). The committee’s political 
legitimacy and independence are assisted by its balanced representation and the 
exclusion of government ministers (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2008: 121). One of the 
government members on the committee is a Treasury Minister, but this is only a 
formality and the Minister plays no active part. 
Membership of the PAC is proportionate to party membership in the House (again this 
is the practice – the Standing Orders are not prescriptive as they are in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales). PAC members are appointed for the length of the life of 
the legislature, although the potential exists for members to be reassigned during the 
term. Permanent membership over the course of a parliament offers stability and will 
normally assist committee effectiveness and it is therefore a little concerning that 
almost half of the current PAC has changed since the start of the Parliament. However, 
the Clerk and the C&AG can also provide continuity.
The PAC consists of both experienced and relatively new members. In the last 
Parliament, the Father of the House of Commons – the member with the longest 
unbroken service in the Commons – was an active member. Over half of the current 
committee were first elected in 2010, but it also includes one Member elected in the 
1970s and two members in the 1990s (including the chair). This mixture of 
experienced and inexperienced members is valuable as it offers an important training 
opportunity for the latter and the former are more likely to understand the ethos of the 
15
civil service.  
One encouraging trend is that attendance by MPs at PAC committee sessions has 
increased dramatically (Figure 1). This may be a result of the pressure on political 
parties to arrange for their own members of select committees to be elected in a 
transparent and democratic way. The application of the 60% attendance rule (where 
any member of a select committee whose cumulative attendance during a Session is 
below 60% should be automatically discharged at the end of that Session) may be a 
further factor. Improved attendance may also be a reflection of the high-profile work 
the PAC is pursuing under its new Chair.
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>
The PAC has always been a busy committee and Members face a heavy workload. It 
meets twice as often as most other committees and the range of subjects reported on is 
impressive. This results in a great deal of work for members with the expectation in 
the 2005-2010 parliament that Members will come to at least half the sessions. This 
appears to have had an impact on attendance. The 2005-10 PAC worked on the basis 
that each Member has 10 minutes for questions, so it is likely that the reduction in the 
size of the committee has created further demands and opportunities for individual 
members on the committee. The number of PAC meetings may increase in future as 
the current PAC was granted the power in the 2010-12 session to allow the committee 
to sit when the House is adjourned, a power available to other select committees. This 
will give the PAC further flexibility when arranging its schedule. The PAC has also 
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continued the practice of its predecessor committee by meeting occasionally outside 
of London in an effort to move away from a predominant London-centric approach.
Chairing the Committee
The chair is required by convention and statute to act on the Committee’s behalf in a 
number of respects and the PAC is invited to agree at the beginning of each parliament 
a resolution recognising those special responsibilities. These normally include dealing 
with any correspondence received (or delegating to staff): is consulted by government 
departments on issues such as contingent liabilities; and on matters of great sensitivity 
has an ex officio statutory role.  
By convention and now set down in the Standing Orders (122B) the Chair of the PAC 
is always a Member of the main Opposition Party. This reflects the practice across the 
Commonwealth where 67 per cent of chairs are opposition members (McGee 2002: 
97). While the Members of the Committee used to formally choose the Chair, the 
practice was for the Opposition whips to select the candidate. Since May 2010, 
however, the Chair of the PAC, alongside the majority of Select Committee chairs, 
is elected by MPs in a secret ballot under the Alternate Vote System. There were 6 
candidates for the PAC Chair position (the most candidates for any Select Committee 
position, which may well reflect the PAC’s reputation as being parliament’s pre-
eminent committee).  The ex-minister Margaret Hodge won the secret ballot, beating 
her nearest rival by six votes in the fifth round of voting. Although all MPs were 
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entitled to vote in the ballot for each Chair, only members of the Labour party were 
eligible to stand as candidates for the PAC position. 
Ms. Hodge cites two main reasons for her election: she is the first woman to hold the 
position of PAC Chair and her high-profile campaign to defeat a fascist candidate at 
the 2010 General Election [4]. It is interesting that her previous government experience 
was not presented as an asset. The importance of executive experience is an under-
researched area when evaluating the impact of Select Committee Chairs and this is 
potentially even more important for a PAC as it scrutinises a much broader area of 
government machinery. Of course a Chair’s own record as a Minister may cause some 
issues of conflict of interest, especially if the time lag is not great between a ministerial 
post and a committee chairmanship. Indeed the very first hearing under Ms Hodge’s 
chairmanship was on a programme she had initiated in government.
There can be little doubt that the PAC has raised its public profile under Ms. Hodge’s 
leadership.  A recent analysis of the most important UK press database (run by Lexis-
Nexis) shows there has been a substantial increase in press coverage of House of 
Commons Committees since 2008 with four committees, including the PAC, being the 
main reason for this increase (Dunleavy, P & Muir, D, 2013). Russell & Benton’s 
(2011: 22) research assessing the performance of select committees in the U.K. found 
that fewer than one in 10 select committee reports could be considered ‘agenda 
setting,’ but the PAC has been successful in setting the agenda on matters concerning 
the issue of tax avoidance of companies [5] for example, and changing the terms of 
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political debate in relation to the costs of High Speed Rail. 
The number of PAC reports also provides an illustration of the PAC’s workload and it 
is perhaps not surprising that the U.K. PAC produces more reports than other UK 
Select Committees given the support of the NAO. As a guide, the PAC produces a 
similar number of reports per session than the Health and Home Affairs Select 
Committees produced over the period 1997-2010 (Russell & Benton, 2011: 18). Figure 
1 does suggest that the number of PAC reports has reduced somewhat. As the activity 
of the PAC is not decreasing, this may be a reflection that the PAC is taking longer in 
its Inquiries as well as the increased focus on follow-up (see below).
One result of the increased public profile is increased attention – and criticism – of the 
PAC and Ms. Hodge’s abrasive style of questioning. Ms Hodge’s campaign to tackle 
company tax avoidance, involving bringing Starbucks, Google and Amazon before the 
PAC to answer questions, was highly regarded, but there have been criticisms from 
business witnesses and anonymous briefings from within the Treasury that the 
prospect of public humiliation at a public hearing will make businesses think twice 
about where to invest (Mason, 2014). The Chancellor of the Exchequer, George 
Osborne, has broken the convention that ministers do not criticise outright the 
conclusions of a PAC report by publicly criticising the PAC and its Chair for its critical 
report on the way that the royal household is controlling the Queen’s finances. This 
may be one of the consequences both of giving the PAC chair a personal mandate and 
the involvement of the PAC in high-profile cases of public concern. Given the 
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increased focus on the PAC, the importance of the evidence-based findings of the NAO 
is likely to become ever more apparent as it will be difficult to dismiss the PAC if it is 
grounded on the NAO’s investigatory work and the committee continues to be non-
partisan. There is no evidence of any criticisms from within the PAC (nor from the 
NAO). Such criticisms would have more serious consequences for the PAC’s 
reputation.
A further criticism of the PAC was made by the former Cabinet Secretary, Lord 
O’Donnell, who expressed concern at the way the PAC questions and treats civil 
servants following a decision by the committee to take evidence from one official 
under oath. There is certainly a very robust approach to questions under the current 
committee and a readiness to challenge individual civil servants. Ms Hodge has 
introduced the practice of calling back civil servants who have changed jobs to answer 
for actions taken in a previous position. Further changes introduced include calling 
witnesses from private companies who provide public services and questioning the 
senior responsible officer within a department rather than the Permanent 
Secretary/Accounting Officer. This is a welcome improvement on previous practice 
which saw many public servants escape accountability to Parliament.
The PAC has also expanded its work from measuring financial impact in terms of 
savings to also include consideration of actual service delivery from the feedback of 
clients.  The NAO has included extensive material on quality of service and client 
feedback for several years, but the PAC has recently begun calling additional witnesses 
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so the committee can hear from those experiencing programmes delivered by public 
money [8]. An examination of the Sessional Returns for this Parliament (2010/13) 
shows that the number of appearances of “other” witnesses – a rather unhelpful 
description – jumped to 36% from 12% in the 2005-2010 Parliament. The percentage 
of appearances by officials from, or representatives of, government departments has 
remained steady (49% compared to 51%) as has the proportion of appearances of 
officials from executive agencies (2.2 % and 4.3%). The biggest decrease has been the 
number of witnesses of officials from or representatives of public bodies and non-
Ministerial departments (12% and 43%). The PAC is also seeking to innovate and take 
on matters under their remit which are separate from the C&AG’s value for money 
reports and the Standing Orders were amended in the 2010-12 Session to allow it to 
appoint specialist advisors, alongside the other Select Committees. 
PAC Reports
A study (Dunleavy et al, 2009: 27-28) of the previous parliament found that some 
departments (for example the Departments of Health and Education) were reported on 
by the PAC much more than others. The same study found that 72 per cent of NAO 
reports go to the PAC, but the take-up rate was comparatively low for the cross-
governmental VFM studies. The study concludes that PAC members tend to find such 
studies ‘too abstract or not meshing with their constituents’ experiences …[or not] 
very newsworthy’. There were 20 cross government reports issued by the PAC 
between 2003-2009, fewer than reports on the Departments of Health, Education, 
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Defence and similar to the Home Office, Department for Work and Pensions, 
Transport and Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 
An examination of PAC reports in the current U.K. Parliament (May 2010 – Feb 2014) 
shows that cross government studies have become the most common subject reported 
upon (Figure 1). The NAO reports that many within government have welcomed 
comparative work between departments and it has responded by increasing the number 
of cross-government studies and by organising and applying its expertise to clusters of 
departments that face similar strategic issues. For example, one cluster covers three 
departments which have almost all the major contracting and long-term project 
activities in government (Defense, Transport and Environment) and it is hoped that 
this cross-scrutiny will encourage government to compare results and learn lessons 
across departments (Public Accounts Commission, 2013).
<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE>
A further method of reporting across sector and cross-government studies is the 
examination of an issue, such as procurement, over a period of time using a consistent 
framework. The NAO has also adapted its approach towards an examination of how 
government is operating in the present, including how projects and programmes are 
set up, instead of the traditional focus on the recent past. The value of this approach is 
that the NAO/PAC can point to issues while they can still be corrected and focus on 
forward planning. For example, on the basis of a report by the C&AG, the PAC 
examined the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Olympic Delivery 
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Authority on the progress that had been made in preparing for the Games, and the areas 
of risk that needed to be managed (PAC 2007).  Such studies boost the timeliness of 
PAC activity and will raise its profile in the media. 
PAC Recommendations and Follow-up
In 2012/13 the government wholly or partially accepted 82% of all the 
recommendations of the PAC (NAO, 2013: 17) which is a substantially higher number 
than the 40% of select committee recommendations accepted by government (Russell 
& Benton, 2011: 7) and the 70% of cases accepted by governments across the 
Commonwealth (Stapenhurst, 2005: 145). The higher success rate of PAC 
recommendations is partly explained by the fact that NAO audit reports are agreed 
with departments, making it difficult for the government to ignore the PAC. PAC 
recommendations also relate to improving the implementation of policy which are 
easier to implement than the recommendations produced by many of the other select 
committee on the actual merit of policy. However, these are still impressive figures 
and it should also be noted that PAC reports are often more hard-hitting and critical 
than both NAO and departmental select committee reports. 
Having recommendations accepted is important – but measuring implementation is 
even more important to demonstrate actions and outcomes from the audit process. The 
government implemented 58% of recommendations in the 2010-12 Parliamentary 
session with the final figure expected to be 90%. (NAO, 2013: 22). Again this is a 
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higher implementation rate than most departmental select committees and one crucial 
variable to determine the success of recommendations identified by Russell and 
Benton (2011) is basing reports on clear evidence and new research.  Such findings 
reinforces the significance of the NAO’s value for money studies and financial audit 
work. 
There is now evidence of a more formal process to monitor and follow-up the 
implementation of government responses to PAC recommendations in the U.K. The 
NAO has a practice of producing comments for the Committee on all government 
responses and, as mentioned above, a number of issues are now considered regularly. 
The PAC does often write to Departments to follow up poor performance, for example 
a recent chain of letters on civil service reform was cited in the PAC’s session on 7 
July 2014 on the Centre of Government. A practice has also been introduced in the 
current parliament where the PAC has a recall session twice a year to study the 
implementation of PAC recommendations. The fear of recall acts as an incentive for 
departments to implement recommendations and there are plans to strengthen recall 
by randomly selecting reports for scrutiny. 
Evaluation of Performance
One criticism of PACs is that they can be too critical and discourage innovation and 
risk. This may be exacerbated by the media’s tendency to focus on reports that are 
critical of departments and permanent secretaries. The PAC does attempt to give praise 
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where it is due: for example its post-Games review into the London 2012 Olympic 
Games and Paralympic Games praised the way government departments worked 
together and with other bodies to deliver complex programmes. However, most of the 
coverage concerned the one negative aspect of the report relating to the planning for 
venue security. It is right that the PAC should act as an incentive to better performance 
in government, but the PAC may have to make more effort to publicise examples of 
good practice to balance the media’s focus on criticisms and to maintain the confidence 
of government departments. 
A common performance measure used by Supreme Audit Institutions and PACs is the 
amount of money saved through its value for money reviews. In 2012-13 60 value for 
money reports were published at an average cost of £197,000, against a target of 
£218,000.  NAO (2013, 14) reports in the U.K. cost more than £100,000 each to 
produce, but its work led to savings to the public purse of almost 1.2 billion. These are 
significant savings at a time of financial pressures and both the NAO and the PAC are 
justifiably credited for helping government to save public money. 
It is difficult to divorce the impact of the PAC from the NAO. Three traditional 
measures used to assess impact are the implementation of PAC recommendations; the 
views of senior public servants who are most affected by the PAC; and the quality of 
press coverage of PAC hearings and reports. Assessing the views of senior public 
servants offers a different methodological approach by looking at relationships and 
anticipated reactions. Russell & Benton (2011) provide a broader definition of select 
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committee influence including, contributing to debate, drawing together evidence, 
spotlighting issues, brokering between actors in government, improving the quality of 
government decision-making through accountability, exposing failures, and 
‘generating fear’. It is not difficult to apply such influence to the work of the PAC 
today. 
In short, the number of PAC recommendations accepted and implemented, though 
impressive when compared with other select committees, may actually understate the 
PAC’s impact on those entities which are answerable before it. Flegmann (1979, 169) 
describes the committee as having a ‘continuous influence on departmental 
administration [and they] make every effort to reduce the number of occasions which 
make it necessary for the Permanent Secretary to appear in front of the PAC’. The fear 
factor is also illustrated by Drewry’s (1989: 157) comment that the PAC is ‘the one 
select committee before which even the most exalted permanent Secretary can be made 
to tremble’. 
Lonsdale (2000) adds a further dimension by arguing that reports by NAO and PAC 
have an impact on parliament itself by providing information that can inform select 
committees’ work. There is certainly evidence that other Select Committees are 
making more use of the NAO. As mentioned earlier, the money budgeted by the NAO 
to Parliament is increasing whilst other budgets are shrinking. The NAO responds to 
queries from select committees and individual MPs and some of these queries 
eventually lead to a full value for money report. The NAO also produces performance 
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briefings to assist Select Committees’ annual oversight of departments’ performance; 
during 2012-2013 the NAO provided 15 select committees with an overview of their 
work to assist the committee in their annual review of the relevant government 
department. This included a review of charity regulation for the Public Administration 
Select Committee and a review of sustainable procurement in government for the 
Environment Audit Committee (NAO, 2013:17).  
Despite some improvement, the NAO’s own figures show a considerable number of 
departmental select committees are still not making use of the NAO in any capacity. It 
is worth restating that any U.K. select committee can take evidence on a NAO report 
if the PAC does not wish to do so. Dunleavy (1990) has proposed that the PAC should 
leave single-department reports to the relevant select committee and focus instead on 
cross-departmental issues in a more focussed way. This has not happened to date and 
there does not appear to be any systematic attempt to encourage Select Committees to 
examine NAO reports on individual departments. The assumption and working 
practice is that the PAC remains the most appropriate committee to undertake inquiries 
based on NAO reports. However, there is also an argument that departmental select 
committees should make use of the NAO’s sector reports to identify and learn from 
general issues in that sector and to assist their examination of Main Estimates, annual 
expenditure and annual resource accounts. It remains to be seen how effective passing 
responsibility to the departmental committees would be in practice and it would 
probably depend on the willingness of the members of each committee, and the chairs 
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in particular, to undertake the task. This could be something to attempt on a trial basis 
with cooperative committees in a future parliament. 
Finally, few PACs adopt a formal mechanism for measuring their performance, and 
this is usually only carried out in an annual review/sessional report or reported directly 
to corporate body/internal management. The PAC is perhaps guilty alongside other 
Select Committees of not addressing the criticisms of Brazier & Fox (2011) by not 
reviewing and assessing the way in which they discharge their work. A strategic plan 
at the start of each Parliament would bring greater accountability of its own work and 
enable the PAC to make a judgment on their own effectiveness, successes and failures 
over the course of the parliament. The PAC chair may find such work useful if she 
decides to seek re-election in the next Parliament, but it would also be a useful device 
in its own right – particularly given the PAC’s increased public profile. A further 
option would be to produce a “legacy” paper at the end of the Parliament  - this will 
be easier to arrange in a fixed-term parliament – as this has proved to be a useful tool 
for passing on experience to successor committees in Scotland. 
Conclusion
 
This chapter has examined the work and performance of the PAC following recent 
changes and trends in public audit and wider changes across the U.K. The committee 
now has a reduced role in scrutinising only those items of expenditure in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland which have not been devolved. At the same time there has 
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been a broadening of access rights, most recently in relation to the BBC and civil list 
expenditure. A further significant change, not without controversy, concerns the 
imminent closure of the English Audit Commission and the transfer of some functions 
to the C&AG and NAO. The PAC and its vocal chair are keen to push the PAC into 
new areas that have hitherto escaped scrutiny. As access rights increase, care will need 
to be taken not to take the NAO/PAC into the policy arena. 
The relationship between the PAC and NAO remains strong with the PAC Chair 
having a leading role in the selection process and the pre-appointment hearing which 
will now take place with a prospective C&AG before the formal appointment. While 
the committee may have less formal power than other PACs in the election and 
dismissal of C&AG, the pre-appointment process and the actual powers and influence 
of PAC Chair (now directly elected) are considerable. It is difficult to imagine a C&AG 
accepting the position without the support of the committee. In terms of the operational 
links between the NAO and PAC, the current Public Accounts Commission – the body 
with responsibility to examine the NAO Estimate and lay it before the House - is 
chaired by the former chair of the PAC and all the members (bar one) are former or 
current members of the PAC (including the current PAC Chair). Therefore, it is rather 
misleading to say that the PAC is removed from operational oversight of the NAO.
PAC Members continue to be appointed for the term of the parliament and this 
longevity of membership together with the maintenance of a nonpartisan culture (there 
has not been a division on a PAC report since the 1960s) has always strengthened the 
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committee. There is a good mix of experienced and newly-elected MPs on the 
committee, although one area of concern is the high degree of turnover of PAC 
members. This is balanced by improved attendance at PAC meetings in the current 
parliament.
The PAC has also increased its public profile under its first directly-elected chair, who 
has been successful in setting the agenda in areas such as tax avoidance and areas of 
topical political debate. She has used her membership of the Liaison Committee to 
raise PAC-related issues in questions to the PM. The changes made to the way the 
PAC operates - questioning the senior responsible officer within a department rather 
than the Permanent Secretary/Accounting Officer and calling back civil servants who 
have changed jobs to answer for actions taken in a previous position – have dealt with 
some of the frustrations expressed by previous committees when trying to enforce 
accountability across the public sector.
The PAC’s higher visibility has led to a great deal of praise as well as some criticism 
of the committee. The non-party aspect of the PAC’s work, and preference for 
unanimity has always been a great asset to the committee, as has its ability to draw on 
the factual and comprehensive reports of the C&AG. These practices and relationships 
become even more crucial following the PAC’s move towards new areas of scrutiny. 
It is also likely that the PAC’s own performance will become subject to greater 
scrutiny. The NAO’s evidence-based reports will not prevent all criticism (nor should 
it) but it does act as a shield for the PAC. Similarly, the PAC acts as a sword to attack 
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waste and poor performance across the public sector as the committee can be much 
more critical and forthright than the NAO and provide the necessary political weight 
to the C&AG’s reports. An enduring working relationship is the result as the two 
bodies enjoy an interdependent relationship. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising 
to learn that the NAO’s support for Parliament is increasing at a time of cuts and 
savings elsewhere within the organisation. It is in the NAO’s interests that the PAC 
maintains its effectiveness.
NAO/PAC reports now range from the traditional value of money sector reports to the 
increasing number of cross government studies. Two further approaches are also 
evident: repeat studies that track performance over a period of time and examinations 
of how government is operating in the present, rather than in the recent past. In terms 
of impact, the NAO and PAC can point to impressive statistics in terms of the 
agreement and implementation of recommendations, even more so when compared 
with other select committees. This is likely to be a result of reports being based on 
clear evidence and the fact that NAO reports are agreed with departments. 
The savings to the public purse through the value for money reviews are impressive – 
especially during a time of financial austerity – but the fact that the NAO/PAC are 
expanding their work to include consideration of actual service delivery from the 
feedback of clients, shows that measuring impact can be broadened from a narrow and 
traditional focus on savings and implementation of audit recommendations. The new 
practice of recall sessions is likely to increase the fear factor, for example and  the 
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PAC’s work and reach across Whitehall supports recent research showing that select 
committee influence is often felt in more subtle ways, such as contributing to debate 
and anticipated reactions. 
There is still much the PAC can do to improve its performance and to avoid the 
committee from appearing too protective about its relationship with the NAO. The 
committee should review and assess the way in which they discharge their work and 
publicise the results, perhaps through a legacy report at the end of this fixed-term 
Parliament. As part of this strategy, the PAC could also encourage other Select 
Committees to make more use of NAO reports, perhaps by encouraging other 
committees on a trial basis to take evidence on single-department reports leaving the 
PAC free to focus in more depth on cross-departmental issues and issues of priority. 
By looking inward as well as outward, the PAC may be able to cement its status as the 
committee primus inter pares among select committees of the House of Commons.
Anthony Staddon
Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Westminster  
Endnotes
[1] PACs have also been established in two British Crown dependencies: Guernsey 
and Jersey with the latter also introducing the position of an Auditor General (AG).  A 
third Crown dependency, the Isle of Man, has also recently restructured its PAC and 
passed legislation agreeing that an AG function should be introduced. The three 
countries are not part of the UK but are self governing dependencies of the Crown.
[2] HC Deb 23 Jan 2088: c1527
[3] Commons Hansard, 19 April 2007, col. 494-495
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[4] Speech given by Margaret Hodge at the 3rd Westminster Workshop: The Public 
Accounts Committee, 24-27 June 2013.
[5] It can do this work because the NAO has the right to examine the role of tax 
authorities in deciding how much private companies paid in tax.
[7] Speech given at Westminster Workshop, March 2012.
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